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ABSTRACT
The role of rewards for maintaining performance incentives in multi-
stage, sequential games of survival is studied. The sequential structure is a
statistical design—of—experiments for selecting and ranking contestants. It
promotes survival of the fittest and saves sampling costs by early elimination
of weaker contenders. Analysis begins with the case where competitors'
talents are common knowledge and is extended to cases where talents are
unknown. It is shown that extra weight must be placed on top ranking prizes
to maintain performance incentives of survivors at all stages of the game.
The extra weight at the top induces competitors to aspire to higher goals
independent of past achievements. In career games workers have many rungs in
the hierarchical ladder to aspire to in the early stages of their careers, and
this plays an important role in maintaining their enthusiasm for continuing.
But the further one has climbed, the fewer the rungs left to attain. If top
prizes are not large enough, those who have succeeded in attaining higher
ranks rest on their laurels and slack off in their attempts to climb higher.
Elevating the top prizes makes the ladder appear longer for higher ranking
contestants, and in the limit makes it appear of unbounded length: no matter
how far one has climbed, it looks as if there is always the same length to go.
Concentrating prize money on the top ranks eliminates the no—tomorrow aspects
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Several recent papers have clarified the problem of incentives in one
shot games when competitors are paid on the basis of rank or relative performance
(Lazear and Rosen [1981], Green and Stokey [1983], Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983],
Holmstrorn [1982], Malcomson [198L], Carmichael [1983], O'Keefe, Viscusi and
Zeckhauser [198L1). The main focus so far has been to establish the circum
stances under which such schemes are efficient, for example when measurement and
environmental factors exert common influences on outcomes. However, a longer
tradition in statistics views the relative comparisons inherent in tournaments as
a problem of experimental design for selecting and ranking contestants. These
two views are joined in this work.
In what follows, I investigate the incentive properties of prizes in
sequential elimination tournaments, where rewards are increasing in survival.
The inherent logic of these experiments is both to determine the best contestants
and promote survival of the fittest; and to maintain the "quality of play" as the
game proceeds through its stages. Athletic tournaments immediately come to mind
as examples, but much broader interest in this class of problems arises from its
application to career games, where the tournament analogy is supported (Rosenbaum
fl98)4]). Most organizations have a triangular structure (Beckmann [1968], Rosen
[1982]) and most top level managers come up through the ranks (Murphy [19814]).A
career trajectory is, in part, the outcome of competition and striving among2
peers to attain higher ranking and more remunerative positions over the life
cycle. The structure of rewards influences the nature and quality of competition
at each stage of the game.
What needs to be explained is the marked concentration of rewards in
the top ranks. For example, Table I shows the percentage prize distribution in
men's professional tennis tournaments. The top four receive 50 percent or more
of the total prize money. Concentration is less extreme in the executive labor
market, but nonetheless, those attaining top ranking positions receive more than
proportionate shares of compensation. One piece of an explanation for this
phenomenon is provided here, where it is shown that an elimination design re
quires an extra reward for the overall winner to maintain performance incentives
throughout the game.
The economics of this is interesting and derives from the survival
aspects of the design. A competitor's performance incentives at any stage are
set by the value of continuation. This is essentially an option value. The
player is guaranteed the loser's prize at that stage, but winning gives the
option to continue on to all successive rungs in the ladder. As the game pro
ceeds, there are fewer steps remaining to be attained and the option value plays
out.The option value expires in the final mate;, where there are no further
advancements to look forward to. At that point the difference in prize money
between winning and losing is the sole instrument available for incentive main-
tenanceand must incorporatethe equivalent of the optionvalue that maintained
incentives at earlier stages. The extra weight of rewards at the top is funda
mentally due to the notomorrow aspects of the game. In effect, it extends the
horizon of players surviving to the final stages. Most remarkably, It makes the
game appear of infinite length to a contestant in the limit, as if there are
always many steps to attain, independent of past achievements. In this respect3
the principle result bears a family resemblance to the role of a "pension" in a
finitely repeated principal and agent problem (Becker and Stigler [19714], Lazear
[1979]).
The next section describes the game. Section III sets forth the nature
of contestants' strategies. Sections IV and V analyze the problem when the
Inherent talents of competitors are known, while section vi analyzes the case
where talents are unknown. Conclusions are found in section VII.
II. DESIGN OF THE GAME
For analytical tractability and simplicity, the basic ideas are best
revealed by analyzing a pairwise comparison structure from the statistics litera-
ture (David [1969]). The tournament begins with players and proceeds sequen-
tially through N stages. Each stage is a set of pairwise matches, as in Figure
1. Winners survive to the next round and losers are eliminated from subsequent
play. Half of all eligible contestants at the beginning of a stage survive to
the next, where another pairing is drawn, and the other half are cut from further
consideration. Thus in a career game those eligible for promotion to some rank
have attained the rank immediately below it. Those who are passed over at any
stage are out of the running for further promotions. The top prize W1 is awarded
to the winner of the final match, who has won N matches overall. The loser of
the final match achieves second place overall and is awarded prize W2 for having
won N—i matches. Losers of the semifinals are both awarded W3, etc.
Define s as the number of stages remaining to be played. Then all
players eliminated in a match where s stages remain are awarded prize
There are 2
1
such players, so if the total purse is H the prize distribution is
constrained by14
R= + 21W51
Define the interrank spread =
W5W51 .ThenAW5 is the marginal reward for
advancing one place in the final ranking, and the total reward for achieving any
final rank is the sum of the marginal increments up to that rank plus the
lumpsum guarantee WN+l .Thesemarginal increments play a crucial role in





Prizes are nondecreasing In survival: > 0 for all s.
I am concerned in this work with studying how prizes affect perform-
ance; in particular with finding some rough characterization of the relative
reward structure that maintains incentives as the game proceeds. This is a piece
of a larger problem of the "optimal" prize structure, the study of which requires
specifying how incentives affect the social value of the game. For example, most
of the literature on this subject assumes that social value is reckoned on the
sum of individual outcomes, but the interactions among contestants are more
complex than that and not well understood. Rather than tying results to a speci
fic and arbitrary inputoutput technology, a common feature of the larger problem
obviously requires that players work at least as hard, if not harder, in the
later stages of the game as in the early stages.
Rank—order schemes are encountered when individual output is difficult
to measure on a cardinal scale, an inherent feature of managerial and many other
types of talent; or when common background noise contaminates precise individual5
assessments of value—added. In athletic games, after which the present design is
modeled, competition is inherently head—to—head and cardinality In any sense
other than probability of winning has little meaning. Those games are essen-
tially ordinal because the point scores used to calibrate performance contain
many arbitrary elements, much like a classroom test. The game of tennis, for
example, would be greatly affected by changing the height of the net and the size
of the court. Presumably the rules of the game evolve to reward those personal
dimensions of talent which have the largest social productivity. Many of these
same considerations apply to selection of managerial talents: success in a lower
ranking position serves as an indicator of expected success in a higher ranking
one.
Given the rules, these complex issues may be finessed for studying the
connection between prizes and incentives by specifying how players' actions
affect the probability of winning. Let i index a player and let j index an
opponent in some match. Consider a game in which there are m types of players.
The ability type of the iplayer is indexed by I and the ability type of the
opponent j-player is indexed by J. Both I and J take on m possible values,
1,2,...,m with m < Let xand xdenote the intensity of effort expended — 53. 83
by players i and j in a match when s stages remain to be played, and let and
represent their abilities or natural talents for the game. The probability
that a player of type I wins in a match against a player of type J (possibly the
same type) is denoted by P(I,J) and assumed to follow the law
Y h(x .)
(2) P5(I,J)Y1h(x5) h(x)6
with h(x) strictly increasing in x and h(O)0. A player increases the prob-
ability of winning the match by exerting greater effort given the talent and
effort of the opponent and own talent. To simplify a complex problem, (2)
assumes that the win technology is identical at every stage (s enters only
through the x's).
When both players exert the same level of effort the win probability
becomes + andits inverse has the natural interpretation of a book-
maker's "morning line" or "true—to—form" actuarially fair payoffs per dollar bet
on each player in this match. Notice also that (2) nicely accomodates common
environmental factors that influence the nature of play. Suppose the common
factor multiplies the terms in Yh(x) for both players. Then whether the common-
ality is match-, stage-, or tournamentspecific, it factors out of the
probability calculation and has rio effect on incentives.
The Poisson proportional hazards form of (2) has a racing game inter-
pretation that has been used to great advantage in the recent literature on
patent races [see especially Loury (1979) and references therein]. Let T be the
arrival time from the beginning of the match. Then H1 —Y1h(x1)is the probabil-
ity of "crossing the finish line" at T given that player ihas continued racing




•Expectedfinishing time for i is 1/H1. The player who arrives
first is declared winner of the match: (2) gives the probability of that event
for player i. Expected completion time of the match itself is(H1 +H)
1, so
larger values of the x's are associated with higher average quality of play,
though of course the realization of actual quality is a random variable.1 How-
ever, the description of the wintechnology In (2) stands irrespective of this7
particular interpretation: just think of it as a function of x1 andx and the
talents of the players.
III. STRATEGIES
A player's decision of how much effort to expend in any match depends
on a cost—benefit calculation. Greater effort increases the probability of
surviving to a higher rank and achieving a larger reward, but involves added
costs. There are two complications. First, the anticipated value of advancing
to the next stage depends on how the player assesses future effort expenditure
and behavior should eligibility be maintained in more advanced stages. This
forward—looking interstage linkage is solved by the usual dynamic programming
recursion, beginning with the final match and working backward to earlier stages
one step at a time. Second, current actions depend on the behavior of the cur
rent opponent and on the anticipated actions of future possible opponents. The
sequential character of the game allows this to be analyzed by adopting Nash
noncooperative strategies as the equilibrium concept at each stage. Discounting
between stages is ignored and players are assumed to be risk neutral.
Define V(I,J) as the value to a player of type I of playing a match
against an opponent of type J when s possible stages remain to be played.
Assume, for now, that all players' talents are common knowledge. Let c(x) be the
cost of effort in any match, assumed identical for all players irrespective of
type. c(x) exhibits positive and nondecreasing marginal cost: c'(x) > 0,
c"(x) > 0 and c(0) =0.The value of the match consists of two components: One
is the prize W1 earned if the match is lost and the player is eliminated, an
event which occurs with probability 1P(I,J). The other is the value of
achieving a final rank superior to s1 if the match is won. Let EV51(I)
represent the expected value of eligibility in the next stage. (I) is a8
weighted average over J of V51(I J), where the weights are the probabilities
that the player in question will confront an opponent of type Jinthe next
stage. These probabilities depend on the activities of players in other matches
at this stage and the rules for drawing opponents at each stage (random draw or
seeding). The probability of continuation is P5(I,J), and costs c(x) are
incurred for either outcome, so the fundamental equation for this problem is
(3) V(I,J)x5,EV81(fl +(1P5(I,J))W1c(x1)J.
The max in (3) is understood on Nash assumptions as conditioned on the given
current and expected future efforts of all other players remaining alive at s and
on the optimum actions taken by the player in question in subsequent matches.
The sequences of solutions {x1) that are simultaneously conformable withequa-
tion (3) for all players is the equilibrium (solution) of thegame.
Substituting (2) into (3) and differentiating with respect to
x51
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where (5) is evaluated at the arguments that satisfy (4). Equation (5) certainly
holds if h(x) has declining marginal product, but h" > 0 is allowed so longas h"9
is riot too large. The marginal condition () indicates that effort inany match
is controlled by EV1 (I) * , thedifference in value between winning arid
losingthe match. This difference must be positive for the player to have an
interest in winning and maintaining eligibility into the next stage. Otherwise,
it is best to default, exert no effort, and take the loser's prize forsure.
Equation (4) defines the best response function for player i. Differ-
entiating with respect to the current opponent's effort yields (the s subscript
is suppressed but understood)
c! (h/h.) 133 (6) ax1iax. =—D(Yh. +Ih) (11h.Ih.). IiJj
Playerl's best reply to the opponent's effort is increasing when the opponent is
not working too hard, but is decreasing when the opponent's effort is suffi—
ciently large. It has a turning point at 11h(x1) =Yh(x.).Beyond that point
it does not pay to keep pace with the opponent because it is too costly to doso.
The turning point occurs at x. =x.for equally talented players (i.e., I
from (6). It turns at some value x. > x. when I Is playing a weaker opponent
> and it turns at some x. < x. when the opponent is the stronger player
< Y). These differences are illustrated in Figure 2, given the same value
of EV W in each case.2
s—i s+1
IV. INCENTIVE MAINTAINING PRIZES: EQUALLY TALENTED CONTESTANTS
The complete solution to the problem is transparent when all players
are equally talented (there is only one type). Then EV1(I) in (3) is simply
V1 because every player knows for sure that an opponent of equal skill will be
confronted at every stage of the game. We also know from Figure 2 that the best10
reply function has a turning point at x1 =x3.
It is furthermore obvious, and
easily shown, that the value of eligibility at any stage is the same for all
survivors. Therefore, the best reply functions for any two opponents in any
match at any stage are mirror images of each other and the equilibrium is sym-
metric: x =x =xfor all i and j;P=1/2in equilibrium, and each match Si 53 5 S
is a close call in expected value. The common level of effort when s stages
remain is, from ()
(7) (V1 W5÷1)(h'(x3)/h(x5))/c'(x)




Then (7) may be manipulated to read as
(9) (V1W1ht(x)/14 =c(x)
in the symmetric equilibrium. Substituting (9) into (3)andusing P 1/2, we
have11
(10) V (1/2)(1i(.)/2)(V1 —W51)
+
÷(i—)w S s—i s s+1
where
(11) =(1/2)(1—
Therecursion in (10) hold•s under the assumption that (4) is a global
maximum at equilibrium. For this to be true, no player can have incentives to
default from x defined by (7), which requires from (10) that
V — (V —W )>0. Therefore > 0, or, from the definitions, 5 s÷1 s s—i s+1 S
n(x)/2c(x)< 1. Otherwise V W51 < 0, and a player is better off taking the
sure loss. There can be rio equilibrium in this game if any player has an incen—
tive to default. For if the i—player defaults, then the j—player guarantees a
win by exerting vanishingly small effort at vanishingly small cost. But if
player j does this, then player i has incentives to put forth only a slightly
larger effort, which drives the solution toward (7).However,at that point
is less than the value of the sure loss, both players default and so itgoes.
The sense of the no—default condition n(x)/c(x) < 2 is related to the
problem of an arms race. If the elasticity of response of effort is large rela-
tive to the elasticity of its cost then players' efforts to win results in a
negative sum game for which a stable equilibrium is not defined. It is not
optimal to default if the opponent does, but at the local equilibrium the costs
of contesting have been escalated so much that both want to default. It is in
fact implicit in (10), that for a given purse and distribution of prizes, players12
are better off the smaller is ii(x) whenthere is less scope for actions to
affect outcomes. The rules of the game must be devised to balance two conflict-
ing forces: games which greatly constrain the effect of actions on outcomes are
unproductive; whereas competition is destructive if the constraints are relaxed
too much. In athletic games this problem is solved by a supreme authority, which
reviews standards of play from time to time and which places limits on rules
changes and the use of new equipment that would otherwise lead to problems.3
Assume the no—default condition holds. Then 0 < < 1 ,forall s.




Thevalue of maintaining eligibility at any stage is the sure prize the player
has guaranteed by surviving that long plus the discounted sum of successive
interrank rewards that may be achieved in future matches. The discount factor
defined in (11) depends on both the equilibrium probability of winning and the
equilibrium elasticity parameters. Taking (12) forward one step and subtracting
yields an expression, which, from (7) or (9), controls incentives to
perform:
(13) (V1 —W1)
= + 2" + + tW.
The difference between the value of winning and losing in equilibrium is the
discounted sum of the forward interrank spreads.
What reward structure maintains incentives to perform at a common value
throughout all stages of the game? Here x x for all s and =Bis a con-
stant for all s, from (11). Then (13) becomes13
(114) V1 — ? +
2w2





= fors =2,3,..., N.
Constant performance requires that(V51 W31) is itself a constant, from
condition (6). Suppose this constant value is k, where k is determinedso that
x =xsolves (6). Then (15) implies
(16) k(1 —B)=LW W, for s 2, 3,..., N
and (114) implies
(17) k = = W/(1
Condition (16) is independent of s, so the incentive—maintaining prize structure
requires a constant interrank spread from second place down. However, from (17)
it requires a larger interrank spread at the top. Prizes riselinearly in incre
ments W k(1 —) fromrank N +1up through rank 2, but the first place prize
takes a distinct jump out of sync with the general linear pattern below it. The
incentive—maintaining prize distribution is convex in rank order and weighs the
top prize more heavily than the rest. See figure 3.
Thissurprising conclusion has a nice economic interpretation. The
value of playing at any stage is essentially an option value reflecting the
probabilities of achieving all possible higher ranks. As the game proceeds, the
option value of continuation might lose value because the end draws nearer. The"I
option for continuation loses all value in the finals and has to incorporate




= + W(2+ + •.. + 1)
=W[(1/(1—))+ + + ... + 1]
for all s,
where the second equality follows from (17) and the last equality from
1/(1-6) 1 + ++ .... Theextra increment at the top converts the value of
the difference between winning and losing at each stage into a perpetuity of
constant value at all stages. It effectively extends the horizon of the players
and makes them behave as if they are in a game which continues forever. This
horizon extending feature of the top prize is one of the fundamental reasons why
rewards are concentrated toward the top ranks. It is clear by the nature of the
proof that concentrating even more of the purse on the top creates incentives for
performance to increase as the game proceeds through its stages. For example, if
the winner takes all, then every term other than the one in in (13) vanishes
and the difference in value between winning and losing increases as the game
proceeds, through the force of discounting: effort is smallest in the first
stage and largest in the finals.
The result in (16) and (17) is robust to a number of modifications:
(i) Risk Aversion. The preference structure implicit in the problem
above is strongly additive; linear in income and convex in effort. Suppose
instead that preferences take the additive form U(W) —c(x5), where c(x) is as
515
before and U(W) is increasing, but not necessarily linear in W. Then the entire
analysis goes through by replacing with U(W) wherever it appears. Incentive
maintenance requires a constant difference in the utility of rewards
U(W1) —U(w2)in all stages prior to the finals, but still requires a jump in
the interrank difference in utility of winning the finals. If players are risk
averse then U"(W) < 0 and the incentive maintenance prize structure requires
strictly increasing interrank spreads, with an even larger increment between
first and second place. The prize structure is everywhere convex in rank order,
with greater concentration of the purse on the top prizes than when contestants
are risk neutral.
The result is related to an "income effect." When U(W) is concave, the
relevant marginal cost of effort is (roughly) the marginal rate of substitution
between W and x, or —c'(x)/U'(W). At the target level of effort c'(x*) is con-
stant, but U'(W) declines as a player continues and is guaranteed a higher and
higher rank. The relevant marginal cost of effort effectively increases in each
successive stage. Convexity of reward is required to overcome these wealth
effects and maintain a player's interest in advancing to a later stage of the
game.
(ii). Symmetric win—technologies. The proof of the proposition on
incentive—maintaining prizes among equally talented contestants rests only on
that property that P is 1/2 in equilibrium. Hence the proposition is independ-
ent of the specific form of (2) and holds for any win technology resulting in a
symmetric equilibrium. This would include, for example, specifications where the
opponent's efforts have direct effects on own—arrival time (e.g., write the
hazard for each player as h(x.,x.) with h1 > 0 and h2 < 0). Furthermore, the
result extends to more than pairwise comparisons: there might be n—way compari-
sons at each stage. In the Poisson case the probability of advancing becomes16
h(xi)/Eh(xk). Then 8 =(1/n)(1-(n—1)(x)/n),but the logic otherwise remains
unchanged.
(iii) Stage effects. The nature of competition may vary across stages.
In particular, tne going may get tougher as the game proceeds. In a corporate
hierarchy the pass—through rate may fall at each successive rank. Similarly the
cost and elasticity of effort parameters may vary with the stage. maybe
smaller in the later stages because higher ranking positions are more demanding
than lower ranking ones. In either case8 decreases as the game proceeds. The
argument that led from (13) to (15) is easily extended: the interrank spreads
M have to be increasing all along the line to undo the incentive dilution S
effectsof greater discounting of the future, which otherwise reduce theoption
value of continuation.
Analysis becomes more complicated when there are direct interstage
spillovers of effort between stages. Two effects may be distinguished: One is a
force of momentum, where effort in one round increases the probability of winning
the next, similar to the effect of learning. The other is a force of fatigue or
depreciation, where greater effort in one match decreases the possibility of
putting forth effort in the next ("burnout"). Extension of the results above at
the symmetric equilibrium are straightforward.5 The force of fatigue leads to
early round "coasting," as players hold back effort, saving energy reserves for
later stages, should they reach them, where the stakes are larger. Here the
prize structure must be less concentrated at the top to induce contestants to put
forth greater effort in the early stages. The logic is reversed in the case of
momentum and learning. Then early round effort has sustained value later by
either reducing future costs or increasing the productivity of future effort.17
This value falls as the game proceeds and the end draws near, so the prize struc-
ture has to be more concentrated at the top to maintain riondecreasing effort.
V. HETEROGENEOUS CONTESTANTS WITH KNOWN TALENTS
The importance of the result in section IV lies in the logic of an
elimination design in promoting survival of the fittest. The conditional dis—
tribution of survivors' abilities shows an increasing mean and decreasing van—
ance at each stage because there is progressive elimination of the weaker
players. If the game is sufficiently long, the contenders in the final stages
are selected among those with greater ability, and differences in their talents
are much smaller than among the initial field. Continuity of the best reply
functions of section III in the l's implies that the result in section IV holds
in the limit in the last few stages of a large—stage game. For if the variance
of talents of remaining eligibles in the final stages is small, the equilibria in
those rounds must be nearly symmetric, becauseEV51 approximates V5, and
survival probabilities of all players remaining in these stages are close to 1/2.
The extra increment, at the top is required to extend the horizon and maintain
performance incentives toward the end of the game.
A sequential design makes the conditional distribution of survivors
exhibit a larger mean talent as the game proceeds because the value of the con—
tinuation option is larger for stronger players than for weaker ones. The weak
are contending for the lower ranking prizes and the strong for top money. Analy-
sis is complicated by these progressive strength—of—field effects. Contestants
kno;. that they are likely to encounter a stronger opponent in a later stage.
This reduces the expected value of continuation. But they are likely to be
matched against a weaker opponent at early stages, and it is easier to win. The
analytical complexity of the problem lies in interactions among matches at any18
stage. A player is not only interested in what the immediate opponent is doing,
but also in what opponents in other matches are doing because the outcomes of
other matches determine the identities of future opponents, which in turn affect
the value of the current match. Consequently the equilibrium at each stage is a
simultaneous 2 player game. This problem cannot be solved analytically, and
must. be simulated.6 However, some progress can be made by examining the condi-
tions that characterize the solution. To simplify, assume that there are two
types of players, with type 1 stronger than type 2 > and that the hazard
and cost functions are of the constant elasticity type, so n, c and 1.1arecon
stants.
Begin with the finals. Here EV51(I) — is for all contestants
independent of type arid symmetry of condition (ii)meansthat the equilibrium is
symmetric irrespective of players' talents. Hence P1(I,J) =1/(Y
+'rd) in
equilibrium. A final match involving equally talented contestants implies
greater effort than one which matches a stronger with a weaker player: see








=(1/2)(1—i.i/2)=, asabove. But the stronger player
wins with larger probability, and (1,2) >> i(2,1), because
P1(1,2) > P1(2,1).
Semifinals
Let denote the probability that the winner of the match in question
will confront a strong player in the finals. This of course depends on the
identities and the x'schosenby players in the other match, but by the logic of19
the Nash solution these actions are taken as given (at their optimized values)by
the opponents in this match. By the definition ofEV51 and the result above,
(20) EV1(I) [ir181(I,1) +(1 ir1)81(I,2)]W1 += 8(I)Mr1+
where
8i(I) =hni8i(I,1) + (1i)8i(l,2)
and
(21) EV1(I) —= 81(I)W1+
W2.
is no less for the strong contestant so (1) > (2) because
81(1,2) > 81(2,1).
Using the result in (21) to examine (Li) leads to two possibilities. If
the two contestants in the match in question are equally talented then the equi-
librium in that semifinal match is symmetric, withP2(1,1) =P2(2,2)
=1/2.But
if the two contestants are not equally talented, the equilibrium is notsymmetric
because the stronger player has a greater value of continuation (21). Thestrong
player exerts greater efforts to win in equilibrium and









(23) 2(1,2) > B1(1,2) >> 8(2,1) >
(23) implies that V2(1,2) > V2(2,1). It also implies that 2(1) > 2(2).












where is the probability a strong opponent will be encountered at s. In
addition (i) > (2) for all s, which by (214) implies that the value of con-
tinuation is larger for stronger players at every stage of the game. Therefore
the second expression in (214) implies that a strong player works harder in a
strong-weak match than a weak player does, and that the weak are eliminated with
probabilities in excess of form [=i1/(i1+i2)Jat every stage except the last. A
sequential design gives an added advantage to the stronger players. This also
verifies intuition that weak players are basically competing for the lower rank
ing prizes.21
Inequality (23) cannot be extended beyond the semifinals without addi-
tional structure. The ordering of these terms for s > 2 oependson the prize
structure, the parameters ('ri, 12 ,), pairingrules, and on the initial
distribution of players by type. However, we do have the followinganalytical
result for the last two stages: If the prize distribution is linear at thetop
= effort by both players in strong—weak matches is larger in the
semifinals than in the finals; and in matches between similar types effort is
also larger in the semis than in the finals. The first part follows from the
fact that(1) necessarily exceeds (2); while the second part follows from
section IV (and in fact holds true for all stages when the prize structureis
linear everywhere). The best reply for each player inany type of match is
larger in the semis than in the finals whenAW.1 =W2.Consequently, the extra
incremental prize at the top remains necessary to extend the horizon andhelp
insure that the final match is the best match.
A small simulation for a two—stage game illustrates these ideasand
shows some effects of seeding. To simplify the calculations, Ichose
== 1.0:hazard and cost functions are linear in x. Further,Y= 2and
=1,so the true—to—form odds in a strong—weak match are 2—to—i in favor of
type 1 .Thesimulation assumes that the game begins with two players of each
type. The total purse is fixed at 1000 and =0.The parameter q refers to
the ratio 1/AW2, so the prize structure is linear whenq =1.Th results, in
Table II should be read as follows: The top numbers in each line refer to effort
expended by player type I in a match against type J. The numbers in parentheses
under the semifinals columns refers to the probability that I beatsJ, whereas
the numbers in parentheses under the finals columns show theprobability that the
final match will be type I against type J. The "all" column under semifinals
shows total effort by all four players in the two semifinal matches; the
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column under Finals shows the expected effort per player in the finals as viewed
from the beginning of the game, and the Expected Total column shows expected
total effort expended by all six players in all matches in the game.
The first panel shows what might happen when players are not seeded and
where the draw pulls strong-to-strong and weak—to—weak in the first round. This
guarantees that both a strong and a weak player advance to the finals (therefore
all the finals numbers in parentheses are 1.0). Equilibria in all matches are
symmetric in this case. The first line illustrates the proposition above:
efforts by players of both types are larger in the semis than in the finals when
the prize structure is linear. When the final spread is twice that of the semi-
final spread, the weaker player exerts more effort in the finals than in the
semifinals, but the strong player still exerts less in the finals. Effort is
increasing in the finals for both types when the spread ratio is 3 or more.
Final round effort is increasing in q because the value of winning the finals
increases in q. However, semifinal effort is decreasing in q. This reflects the
budget constraint (1) that with a given purse an increase in q necessarily
requires decreasing iW2, which decreases so much that the value of winning at
s =2falls. With this parameter configuration the decline in effort with q is
relatively small for the stronger players. Total effort in the semis falls with
q, but the increase in final round effort with q more than offsets this. Total
effort in all matches is increasing in q.
The second panel shows the effects of seeding, with first round matches
assigned strong—weak. Now there are three possible matches in the finals:
strong—strong, weak—weak, and strong—weak. The first line illustrates the propo-
sition again. With linear prizes the strong player exerts 92.7 units in the
(1,2) semifinal match and 74.1 units in the possible (1,2) final match: the weak
exert 81.6 in the (2,1) semi match and 7'4.1 in the (2,1) final match. With23
seeding this effect is eliminated by the time q is 2 or more. The probability
the strong player wins the semis increases in q and so does the probability the
final match will be strong—strong, though the rate of increase is small.Again,
semifinal effort is falling in q and final effort is rising in q. This reflects
increasing discouragement of weak players with q in the first round, because they
know they will have to work increasingly hard in the finals and still lose with
the same probability of 2/3. Discouragement of the weak means the strong don't
have to work as hard to gain the finals.
Comparing across panels, we see that seeding makes both types of
players work less hard in the semifinals than no seeding, and no less hard and
probably harder in the finals. There is less variance in semifinal effort
across player types with seeding, and the final match most probably exhibits a
larger quality of play and between higher quality opponents. Notice, however,
the surprising result that the total effort expended in all matches for a given
prize structure is larger when players are not seeded, at least with this para-
meter configuration. Seeding produces less variance in efforts in the first
round, but a lower mean in that round, and it most likely produces a better match
among more talented opponents in the finals. The final interrank spread must be
greatly elevated in the seeding game to produce a level of total effort compar-
able to the no—seeding game. This suggests that seeds are observed when the
distribution of the quality of play among players and stages, and guaranteeing
the best match at the end are important for the social productivity of thegame,
not simply total effort expended.7 It justifies my reluctance to specify an
additive social value function for the purposes of calculating an "optimal" prize
structure.214
VI. HETEROGENEOUS CONTESTANTS WITH TALENTS UNKNOWN
Suppose we are interested in choosing the best out of T possible
"treatments." A round—robin design matches each treatment (player) against every
other and chooses the one with the largest overall win percentage. A sequential
or knock—out design eliminates a treatment from further consideration after it
has lost a certain number of times. The sequential design promotes the survival
of the fittest and saves sampling co5ts by eliminating likely losers early in the
game, but provides less precise information. The choice between them comes down
to comparing sampling costs with the value of more precision or the loss of
making errors. David [1960] suggests that knock out designs have advantages over
round robins in selecting the best contestant, and Gibbons, 01km and Sobel
[1977] prove this is true on the basis of sequential statistical decision theory.
There are other possibilities. For example, medical trials are crudely described
by analogy to boxing: the treatment—of—choice is "king of the hill." From time
to time contenders come along and occasionally knock off the existing champion.
Statisticians have analyzed these kirids of problems in the method of paired
comparisons (David [1969]) and there is a parallel mathematical literature from
the point of view of graph theory (Moon [1970]). However, it is not possible to
apply those results to selection in human population because no account is taken
of the strategies and incentives of the contestants to optimize against the
experimental design.
A. The Case of Symmetric Ignorance
Consider a sequential single elimination design, in which there are m
types of contestants. The distribution of types is common knowledge, and there
is no private information: all contestants share the same priors on who their
opponents might be and, equally important, are equally ignorant about their own
talent. The sequential design allows Bayesian updating of own talents and the25
strength of the field as the game proceeds. This information feeds back into
each contestant's strategy at every stage. 4hen contestants have no more infor—
mation about themselves than their surviving opponents do, it is clear that the
most interesting focus for analysis is the symmetric equilibrium. For in single
elimination events all survivors share the same information set ——thesame
winning record, and therefore choose the same strategy.
Let a(I) denote the probability that a player is type I when s stages
remain to be played, and let (J) denote the player's assessment that the
current opponent is type J. Then, from Bayes' rule, the player's assessment of
himself when s—i stages remain, conditional on winning at stage s, is
(25) a1(1) =Pr(winat stage sI)a (I)/Pr(win at stage s)
= (I) (J)P (I,J)/a (I) (J)P (I,J) 5Js
5IJs
S S
whereP3(I,J) is the win technology in (2); c5(J)P(I,J)is the conditional
J
probability of winning given that one is type I; and the unconditional probabil-
ity of winning at stage s is the denominator of (25). Assuming commonality of
the initial prior distribution, information is common at all s and(I) =a5(I)
at the symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, all contestants choose the same
effort at each s, so P3(I,J) =•+ i)and survival chances for each type
run true—to—form at each stage irrespective of the effort levels cnosen. Final-
ly, the unconditional symmetric equilibrium probability of winning at each s is




which provides a recursion for calculating the expected survival probabilities
for each type at each s, given the initial distribution of talent.
Survival probabilities are increasing for the strong players and
decreasing for the weaker players as the game proceeds. There is survival of the
fittest. To illustrate, suppose there are two types: > and let a be the
expected proportion of stronger, type—i players alive at s (so the survival
proportion for the weak is (1 —a).Some manipulation of (26) yields:
(27) a a =a(1 a )t s—i s s s
where w =(Y 12)/(Y1 + is the difference in form—win probabilities between
types. The differential equation associated with (27) is the generating function
of a logistic. The weak are eliminated at the largest rate at the "diffuse
point" where a =1/2.They are eliminated at a slower pace when they are either
a large or small percentage of the existing population, in the latter case be-
cause the strong knock each other off with greater frequency, and in the former
case because of their large weight in the population. The rate of elimination of
the weak also depends on w. Convergence is very fast when w is large. For
example, if the initial proportion is 1/2, and w is close to unity (its maximum
possible value) over 99 percent of expected survivors are strong after three
stages. More stages are required to select the fittest members of the population
the smaller the initial values of a and w. See Figure 6.27
Now the value of survival depends on a player's assessment of own and
opponents' talents at any stage. The problem is illustrated for the case of two




where the win probability is conditioned on the information available at the
beginning ofstage5:
(29) Pr(winja, a) =a[aP(i,1) +(1a)P(1,2)J +
(1—a)[aP(2,1) +(1a5)P(2,2)J.
In choosing a strategy at s, the player weighs the possibilities of'ownand
opponent's talent pairings by the information currently available. This informa—
tion depends on the record of the past and is exogenous data as of stage s. The
player's assessment of the future strength of an opponent depends on the
efforts of players in other matches, which is exogenous in the current match
under Nash assumptions. However, the player's assessment of his own talent in
the next match depends on today's actions and outcomes according to the Bayesian
updating formula (25) and this must be taken into account in choosing effort at
the current stage. The Bayesian link between stages s and s —1relates to the
value of information in dynamic programming and introduces an interstage linkage
in strategies that is not present when talents are known.
The first order condition for this problem is28
(30)PrH
[V51(a51, W1J
+Pr(winI.)[V51(cL51, 5_i) 5_1J(5_1"3x81) —c'(x51)
=0
The derivative in the first term in (30) is calculated from (29) and cz1/ax.
in the second term is calculated from (25), both given x5.. An expression for
the value term V 1Iaa is found by applying the envelope property to (28):
(31) 3V(a, a)/cL =[V51(a51,a5_i)W1](Pr(winja, cL)/a)
since the effect of a on x and on V51 vanish by the first order condition
(30). The condition that characterizes the symmetric Nash solution is found by
evaluating (30) at a =aand x, x5,3 for all s.The interstage linkage is
provided by the second term in (30) and is the value of information.
Writing V V (a ,a)detailedcalculations at the symmetric solution 555 5
yieldthe following:
av/=(V w)(w/2) s s s1 s





The first condition states that the equilibrium value of continuation is increas—
ing in own assessment of talent, and that this incremental value is increasing in29
w, the difference in form probabilities between types. The value of information
is small when contestants are not very different from each other. The marginal
effect of effort on the win probability in the second condition is decreasing in
the extent of heterogeneity of the population (w) and in the degree ofuncer-
tainty with which players assess themselves at each stage (ci). There is the most
uncertainty when a =1/2.Uncertainty is a force that dampens incentives to
perform. As the uncertainty is resolved anda5 approaches unity this dampening
effect disappears. The third expression in (32) shows howx5 affects assessments
of talent if one survives to the next stage.The effect is unambiguously nega-
tive: given the equilibrium effort of the opponent, the winning contestant is
more probably of greater talent if less effort has been expended. The magnitude
of this term also depends on the extent of heterogeneity and uncertainty. It
vanishes as ciapproacheszero or unity and is numerically largest somewhere in
between. The elimination design places extra value on strength, and private
incentives to experiment to discover own strength is another force tending to
make players hold back efforts at earlier stages.
Plugging (32) into marginal condition (30) converting to elasticities
and evaluating at the symmetric equilibrium, we have
(33) c(x)=[. A5](V1
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The "law of motion" in (27) is used to calculate A and B. Condition (33) does
not hold as written for the finals (s =1).There is no private value of experi-
mentation in the finals because additional information cannot be exploited. The
boundary condition B1 =0allows (33) to stand for all s. Substituting into the
value function,
(35) V =(8—A)(V —W ) +B(V —W) +W
S $s—i 5+1 s s—2 s s1
Subtracting W provides a recursion for the increments V —W s+2 ss2
(36) V —W (8A )(V —W ) +B(V —W) +
S s+2 s s—isi s s—2 s s+1
This may be solved with another boundary condition, really a definition, that
—
AW1.
Conditions (35) and (33) plus the boundary conditions (and the calcula-
tion of A and B from (27)) represent the complete solution of the symmetric
ignorance problem for any feasible wage structure. We notice immediately, from
(31), that this solution converges in the limit to that of equal known talents in
section IV as approaches unity. For then A5 and B5 go to zero. Hence the
extra increment in the final interrank spread is required for incentive main-
tenance in a sufficiently long game, irrespective of the initial distribution of
talents. By a similar token, the earlier result also must hold approximately
when the heterogeneity parameter is small.
In fact heterogeneity must be quite large for the value of information
to have much effect on the incentive maintaining prize structure of figure 3.
This is illustrated by the parameters of'table2: =2,2 =1and t= 1.The31
strong type wins two—thirds of the time and 1/3, Direct calculation reveals
that B5 is of order 10for any feasible value of and that A5 is of order
io2. Therefore the second difference effects in (33) and (36)are negligible
and the first difference effects appear much as they did in section IV. Figure 3
is a very close approximation to the incentive maintaining prize structure under
symmetric ignorance in this case. When the strong player wins three—fourths of
the time, the corresponding orders of magnitude are 10 2 for both terms, so the
approximation in Figure 3 remains very good: there are only a few minor wiggles.
Major departures occur when there are major differences between types,
but this is in large measure due to the incentive dilution effects of uncertainty
and in much lesser part due to the incentives to acquire private information.
Thus even when the strong player wins 90 percent of the time the terms in B5
remain of order 10
2
and the second difference terms are negligible. But the
terms in A show more variation with ,whichamounts to a variable discount 5 S
factor in the value of continuation formula. ( —A)is smallest in those
stages where uncertainty is largest and the interrank spread has to be increased
in those stages to overcome larger discounting of the future. Thus consider a
tournament where the known proportion of strong players is relatively small in
the first round. Then early round incentive—maintaining prizes are approximately
linear because there is little uncertainty. As the weak players are eliminated
andrises toward 1/2, uncertainty is increasing and the interrank spread has
toincrease to overcome this effect. If the game is long enough to pass over the
diffuse point (a 1/2), uncertainty is decreasing and the interrank spreads are
decreasing for incentive maintenance. They increase toward the end, due to the
horizon effects, though the final round increment isshadedby the effects of
experimentation. If the initial proportion of strength is in the neighborhood of
1/2,these resolution—of—uncertainty effects act to distribute the prize money32
more equally across the ranks and not concentrate it so heavily on the top. If
the initial proportion aN is small and the game is long the prizes redistribute
from the extremes towardthemiddle.
One final point can be made: the expeted selection recursions in (26)
or (27) show that the social value of information is independent ofx5 in the
symmetric equilibrium: all information in selecting strong players for survival
is embedded in the elimination design itself. In this respect the incentives for
contestants to optimize against the design and produce private information come
to naught because all players consider these possibilities in their private
strategies and no one obtains an informational edge over that inherent in the
design. There is a role for the prize structure to discourage these socially
useless actions, and this requires less concentration of the prize money at the
top. However the calculations above suggest that these effects are relatively
minor unless differences in talents are enormous.
B. Private Information
The opposite extreme to the case of symmetric ignorance is when players
know their own relative talent, but are informed about opponents' talents only up
to a shared distribution of prior beliefs. Continuing with the case of two
types, each contestant knows for sure that he is either or 2 and all share
the same prior that the proportion of strong players in the game at the initial
round is a. The draws at each stage must be random in this case, so contestants
maintain the same assessments that a strong player will be drawn at a given
stage. There is no incentive to gain private own information, but each contest-
ant updates beliefs about the strength of potential future opponents through the
natural selection of the elimination design.
Analysis is conceptually straightforward, but computationafly compli-
cated because the solution does not disassemble recursively. Thus, consider33
survivors' strategies at some stage s.Suppose the probability that a strong
player will be encountered in the current match is
it5.Theex ante value of
continuation is a probability weighted average across current opponent types, and
the ex ante strategy shares this feature: each player's best response function
is a it—weightedaverage of the functions in Figure 2. Thus a strong player's
best reply is a weighted average of the curve in the middle of the figure and the
one to the right. If the probability of encountering a strong player is large,
it is closer to the one in the center, and if the probability of encountering a
weak player is large it is closer to the one on the right. Similarly, a weak
player's reaction function is a weighted average of the curve on the left and the
one in the center.
Uncertainty about the current opponent's ability is resolved ex post:
either an opponent of the same type has been drawn, in which case the ex post
outcome in this match is symmetric; or an opponent of the opposite type has been
drawn, in which case the ex post equilibrium is not symmetric. The value at s is
a weighted average of these two possibilities. The equilibrium assessment of
depends on the assessment of surviving strength at the beginning of the prior
stage and on the equilibrium probability that a strong player won a strong—weak
match at s—i .Hencethe value at s depends on the actionsof players in other
matchesin previous stages. Now in the case of known talents (section V) the
equilibriumis symmetric in any match—pair in the final round. However, the
final round equilibrium in a strong—weak match is not symmetric in this case,
except by accident. Hence the equilibrium across all matches and all stages must
be solved simultaneously.
Taking the linear prize structure as a benchmark for analyzing incen-
tive maintenance reveals two forces: First, the value of continuation is larger
for a strong player than for a weaker one, as in section V, so the best reply to3k
an opponent of given skill (the functions in Figure 2) is larger for a strong
player than for a weak one. When prizes are linear, these response functions are
declining as the game proceeds through its stages, as above; and for a given
assessnent of field strength the weighted average ex ante strategy is also de-
clining across successive stages. Second, the equilibrium probability weight on
the presence of a strong opponent increases as the game proceeds. Hence a strong
player's best reply increasingly resembles the middle curve in Figure 2 and a
weak player's reply increasingly resembles the curve to the left of center in
Figure 2. The first effect is a force tending to reduce the effort of all
players as the game proceeds, while the second effect ——thata strong opponent
is more likely to be encountered in each successive match if one survives —--isa
force that tends to increase effort of the more likely strong survivors as the
game proceeds. It is not possible to establish analytically which effect domi-
nates overall. However, we have the usual limiting result that if the initial
proportion of strong players is large enough, or if the game is sufficiently long
to ensure that most survivors of the final stages are strong, the second effect
vanishes and the top prize increment has to be large to maintain final round
incentives.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The chief result of this analysis is in identifying a unique role for
top ranking prizes in maintaining performance incentives in career and other
games of survival. That incentive maintenance requires extra weight on top
ranking prizes rests on the plausible intuition that competitors must be induced
to aspire to higher goals independent of past achievements. Competitors have
many rungs in the ladder to aspire to in the early stages of the game, and this
plays an important role in maintaining their enthusiasm for continuing. But35
after one has climbed a fair distance there are fewer rungs left to attain, If
top prizes are not large enough, those that have succeeded in achieving higher
ranks rest on their laurels and slack off in their attempts to climb higher.
Elevating the top prizes effectively makes the ladder appear longer for higher
ranking contestants, and in the limit of making it appear of unbounded length:
no matter how far one has climbed, there is always the same length to go. Much
attention has been paid in recent years to the question of whether or not earn-
ings are proportional to marginal product. In problems of this type, the concept
of marginal productivity has to be extended to take account of the viability of
the organization in maintaining incentives and selecting the best personnel to
the various rungs, not only the output produced at each step. Payments at the
top have indirect effects of increasing productivity of competitors further down
the ladder,
Triere is another interesting class of questions in this type of compe-
tition. Smith held the opinion that there is natural tendency for competitors to
overestimate their survival chances ("overweaning conceit"), while Marshall held
the opposite opinion. This analysis shows how biased assessments of talent
affectsurvival chances. Analysis of the strategies in Figure 2 reveals that
thereis a clear disadvantage to pessimism and underestimation of own talents.
Not only is there a direct effect of not trying hard enough because the typical
opponent appears to be relatively stronger, but the pessimist also underrates the
true value of continuation and this induces even less effort. An elimination
design is a disadvantage to the timid because they are eliminated too quickly.
The effects of overestimation and optimism are more subtle. For strong players
and among any contestants in a field of comparable types, optimism has two coun-
tervailing forces: the optimist has a tendency to slack off due to underestima-
tion of the relative strengths of the competition, but overestimates the own36
value of continuation, which induces greater effort. Optimism has no clearcut
effects on altering survival probabilities for these reasons. Still, optimism
has positive survival value for weak players in a strong field. A weaker player
who feels closer to the average field strength than is true, works harder on both
counts and is not eliminated as quickly as another weak competitor with more
accurate self—assessments.
Finally, there are incentives in rank order competition for a contest-
ant to invest in signals that mislead opponents' assessment of his strength. It
is in the interest of a strong player to make rivals think his strength is
greater than it truly is: the direct effect on the opponent's strategy works to
induce the opponent to put forth less effort, and the indirect effect is trivial.
The same is true of a weak player in a weak field. However, it is in the inter-
ests of a weak player in a strong field to give out signals that he is even
weaker than true, to induce the strong opponent to slack off. To the extent that
such investments are socially costly, there is a role for the prize structure to
reduce them. This requires weighting the top prizes less heavily than when such
effects are not present.37
FOOTNOTES
*1 am indebted to Edward Lazear, Kevin M. Murphy, Barry Nalebuff, and
Nancy Stokey for important suggestions at various stages of development of this
work; to Gary Becker, James Friedman, Sandy Grossman and David Pierce for com-
ments on initial drafts and to Robert Tamura for research assistance. This
project was supported by the National Science Foundation.
1That (2) is the form ofa logit leads to an alternative interpreta-
tion. Think of H. as an index of labor efficiency on an ordered, linear scale.
If labor efficiency is distributed as sech2 then (2) follows from the usual logit
assumptions.
2The best reply function exhibitsa point of discontinuity if (5)
fails; then effort of the i—player jumps down when the opponent is working suff i-
ciently hard. This can lead to random strategies in the Nash solution (Nalebuff
and Stiglitz [1983]). The present analysis is confined to pure strategy solu-
tions, which require a strict upper bound on h"(x). Also one might expect a weak
player to employ a riskier strategy against a stronger opponent (Bronars [1985]),
but (2) is not suitably parameterized to allow for this.
3The rules of thegame and procedures used to determine winners affect
the forms of c(x) and h(x): see the related discussion in O'Keeffe et al.
[1984]. In athletic games equipment producers and players have private incen-
tives to introduce new techniques and styles of play, and complementary capital
to create a winning eoge. An Authority is needed to maintain the "integrity of
the game" and prohibit those innovations which escalate the collective costs of
competition relative to social values. In the career setting these incentives
are sources of technical change. There the market disciplines "unfair" competi-
tiori because such organizations have a higher supply price of new recruits.38
14
The purse must be large enough to support V5 > 0 for all s. It is
obvious that feasible x is bounded from above for this condition to hold.
Another upper bound is implied by contestant's outside opportunities, but is
ignored here.
5However, complete analysis is complicated because theremay be asym-
metric equilibria. The best response functions may intersect more than once, and
the backward recursion breaks down at the asymmetric equilibria.
is a major league computational problem for many types and
stages. The shape of the best reply functions in figures 2, 14, and 5 shows that
the solution is not a contraction.
70f course a random draw with no seeding couldproduce the second panel
in the Table II, and does so twothirds of the time with two players of each
type. Nonetheless, the probability that the best players arrive at the final
match is smaller than with seeding. For example, the .53 probability of (1,1) in
the finals when q =3with seeding is decreased to .35 without seeding and the
.140 probability of (1,2) in the finals with seeding is increased to .60 without
seeding.
8Notice that theupdating of own—assessment of talent conditional on
losing has rio value in single elimination contests because the player does not
continue. It would have value in games with double, or more eliminations.
However, the equilibrium would not be symmetric. Nor would it be symmetric, even
with single eliminations, if contestants' observed finer information on past
performances instead of only a win—loss record.39
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TABLE 1
Men's Tennis: 19814 0n-Site Prize Money Distribution Formula,














1 19.23 27.27 20.51 27.27
2 9.62 13.614 10.26 11.36
324 14.81 6.82 5.6'4 5.91
5—8 2.1424 2.95 3.08 3.18
9—16 1.241 1.36 1.92 2.10
17—32 .77 .68 1.03 1.25
3364 .245 .140 .143
65—128 .22
Notes
acovers 80 international single elimination events. On—sitemoney does not
include contributions to end—of—season bonus pools. 62.5 percent of the
$2.LiM singles pool goes to the top 24 season ranked players and 64.2percent
of the $.6M doubles pool goes to the top 14teams.
bTotal tournament on—sitepurse split 78 percent for singles, 22 percent for
doubles. Figures refer to shares of singles and doubles components of the
total respectively. Each person in a tied rank receives the share
indicated. Weighted shares may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
cFrench Open, Wimbledon, U.S. Open and AustralianOpen. Draw refers to
number of players or teams. 96 draw singles events are slightly more
concentrated on top ranks.
don_site totalpurse of $25,000 or more.
Source: Official 198J4 Professional Tennis Yearbook of the Men's
International Professional Tennis Council. New York, 19814.42
Table II: Two—Stage, Two-Types Simulation (1 =2;2








1 120.3 92.6 1425.9 714.1 714.1 5714.1
(.5) (.5) (1.0)
2 118.1 76.14 388.9 111.1 111.1 611.1
(.5) (.5) (1.0)
3 116.6 60.7 366.7 133.14 133.14 633.3
(.5) (.5) (1.0)
5 115.1 55.5 3141.3 158.8 158.7 658.7
(.5) (.5) (1.0)








1 92.7 81.6 3)48.6 83.3 83.3 714.1 79.14 507.14
(.69) (.31) (.148) (.09) (.143)
2 82.6 66.7 298.6 125.0 125.0 111.1 119.3 537.2
(.71) (.29) (.51) (.08) (.141)
3 76.1 57.7 267.7 150.0 150.0 133.14 1143.3 5514.14
(.73) (.27) (.53) (.07) (.140)
5 68.3 147.1$ 231.3 178.5 178.5 158.8 171.0 573.3
(.714) (.26) (.55) (.06) (39)
8 62.0 39.6 203.2 200.0 200.0 177.8 191.8 586.9
(.76) (.214) (.57) (.06) (.37)
aNotes. q =
/W1/1W2.Purse=1000,W3 =0.x(I,J) is effort expended by player of type
I against opponent of type J when s stages remain. Numbers in ()underSemi-
finals is probability type I wins match against J. Numbers in () inFinals is
the probability that a match of type (I,J) occurs. Probability that I wins final
against J is always43





s—iFigure 2: i-p1ayers best response
3rd 2nd 1st


























Figure 4: Equilibrium in Finals
xli
weak player (i)//
strong player (i)9
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